City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Student Theses

Baruch College

1-1-1996

Conditional reasoning : the claim that people have a special
sensitivity to deontic regulations is mistaken
Hye Jee Kim
Baruch College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/33
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Conditional Reasoning:The Claim That People
Have a Special Sensitivity to Deontic Regulations
is Mistaken
by
Hye Jee Kim©
1996
Baruch College of the City University of New York
Running head: CONDITIONAL REASONING
Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors of Baruch College of The City
University of New York in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology with Honors.

Introduction
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
General Discussion
References
Notes
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7

Conditional Reasoning: The Claim That People Have a
Special Sensitivity to Deontic Regulations is Mistaken
Several theoretical proposals over the last decade have held that human inference making
is governed by content-dependent processes, and that content-general processes are rare

or absent. Cheng and Holyoak (1985), for example, claimed that reasoning typically uses
pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are inductively acquired clusters of abstract rules
that are highly generalized and defined with respect to classes of goals and types of
relationships. Pragmatic schemas are thus a type of abstract knowledge structure induced
from everyday life experience, which are context sensitive and used only when an
appropriate goal and content are present. In contrast to Cheng and Holyoak's inductively
acquired schemas, Cosmides (1989) proposed some rules for reasoning about social
contracts that are claimed to be phylogenetically acquired Darwinian algorithms. From
this perspective reasoning is governed by reasoning modules that are specific to social
goals and their appropriate content. In particular, Cosmides claimed that these algorithms
produce and operate on cost-benefit representations of social exchanges and contain
inferential procedures that make a reasoner innately sensitive in detecting instances of
cheating on social contracts. Although neither Cheng and Holyoak nor Cosmides have
ruled out the possibility that there are other sorts of content-dependent schemas, the only
sort for which they have developed anything specific concerns deontic conditionals that
deal with social roles and regulations (e.g., for permissions or obligations). (1)
Manktelow and Over (1991) proposed that deontic conditionals convey subjective
utilities, and that when people make judgments about deontic conditionals they consider
these utilities. They claimed that people's deontic reasoning depends on their
representation of the utilities associated with the agent of a deontic conditional statement
(the party who lays down the rule) and an actor (the party whose behavior is its target);
they argued that people attach different utilities to the outcomes of relevant actions they
or others might perform. Hence, because people are able to distinguish clearly between
social roles and associated subjective utilities in deontic contexts, they are able to make
inferences concerning them.
Although these three theories differ from one another in the precise mechanisms by
which they explain reasoning processes (and in the proposed developmental sources of
these mechanisms), the approaches share two features. First, they place deontic
conditionals in a special role, in which a centrally important mode of human reasoning is
governed by inference mechanisms that are particular to the deontic domain. Second, the
empirical base for each of these theories relies almost entirely on some findings with
variants of a single sort of reasoning task--Wason's selection task.
Since its introduction (Wason, 1966), Wason's selection task has been the single most
investigated deductive reasoning task in the psychological literature. In the standard
problem, subjects are presented a rule of the form If P then Q and a set of cards to which
the rule applies. For example, subjects are told that a set of cards each has a letter on one
side and a number on the other and presented cards showing A, D, 4, and 7, respectively,
together with the rule "If there is A on one side of a card then there is 4 on the other side
that card." Subjects are then asked to select those cards, and only those cards, that are
necessary to turn over in order to find out whether the rule is true or false. Note that the
selections that would be made from the perspective of standard logic are the cards
showing A and 7 (P and Not Q ), because these are the only cards that could lead to a
counterexample when turned over (i.e., to an instance of P and not Q), and only a

counterexample falsifies a conditional. However, fewer than 10% of adult subjects
usually have selected these cards: the most common responses have been to select only
the card showing A or the combination of the cards showing A and 4 (see review in
Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993).
Interest in the selection task has stemmed largely from findings of a content effect, i.e.,
that variants of the task are solved when presented with certain sorts of materials.
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi (1972), for example, asked their subjects to
pretend that they were postal workers who had to determine which envelopes were
potential violators of the rule that "If a letter is sealed, then it has a 50 lire stamp on it,"
and shown four envelopes (sealed, unsealed, 50 lire, less than 50 lire, respectively);
similarly, Griggs and Cox (1982) asked their subjects to assume the role of a policeman
who was trying to find potential violators of the rule that "If a person is drinking alcohol,
then that person must be over 19 years of age," and required them to select from among
four cards showing a person drinking alcohol, a person drinking coke, a person over 19,
and a person under 19, respectively. The general finding with problems such as these is
that a substantial majority of subjects have selected the P and not Q cards.
Although it at first appeared that the difference between the sorts of tasks that were not
solved, such as the standard task, and the sorts that were successfully solved, such as the
postal-rule and drinking-rule problems, was that the latter sort presented thematically
realistic materials, this explanation has turned out not to be the case. Manktelow and
Evans (1979), for example, reported several thematically meaningful versions that
subjects failed to solve.
Interest in the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory (PRS theory) of Cheng and Holyoak
(1985) has occurred in large part because the theory provided an explanation of the
findings concerning content influences with the selection task: The thematically
meaningful versions of the task that subjects successfully solved have been those that
presented deontic conditional rules, particularly rules for permissions. According to PRS
theory, those task versions elicited the P and not Q selections because their permission
rules evoke a permission schema, whereas task versions without a pragmatic rule evoke
no such schema. The permission schema proposed by Cheng and Holyoak consists of
four production rules, as follows:
Rule 1. If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied.
Rule 2. If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be satisfied.
Rule 3. If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken.
Rule 4. If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken.
The schema leads to selection of the P and not Q cards because the antecedents of the
first and fourth production rules correspond to those cards and the consequents specify
necessities. The not P and Q cards are not selected because they correspond to the

antecedents of the second and third production rules, and the consequents of these two
rules specify only possibilities.
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) presented several realistic-content versions of the task that
had permission rules, and reported that task versions presenting a deontic permission
regulation tended to be solved, particularly when a reason for the regulation was clearly
understood. More recently, several investigators of children's reasoning have reported
similar findings with children as young as four-years of age showing an ability to identify
the P and not Q cards as potential violators of deontic rules, but failing to make such
identifications when presented similar problems without deontic rules (e.g., Girotto,
Gilly, Blaye, & Light, 1989; Harris & Nunez, in press). Indeed, Harris and Nunez
expressed that children seem to have a special sensitivity to understanding when deontic
conditionals are violated.
The most persuasive evidence presented by Cheng and Holyoak was in their Experiment
2, where they compared an abstract-content problem with a permission rule to an
abstract-content problem with a nondeontic rule of the sort found in the standard version
of the task; the abstract permission-rule problem led to P and not Q responses
significantly more often than did the abstract non-pragmatic rule problem, indicating the
possibility that it was the permission rule per se that led to task solution, rather than any
possible familiarity of content.
The two problems from Experiment 2 of Cheng and Holyoak (1985) are as follows. The
abstract permission-rule problem stated:
Suppose you are an authority checking whether or not people are obeying
certain regulation. The regulation all have the general form, "If one is to take
action A, then one must first satisfy precondition P." In other words, in order
to be permitted to do A, one must first have fulfilled prerequisite P. The
cards below contain information on four people: one side of the card
indicates whether or not a person has taken action A, the other indicates
whether or not the same individual has fulfilled precondition P. In order to
check that a certain regulation is being followed, which of the cards below
would you turn over? Turn over only those that you need to check to be
sure." These instructions were followed by drawings of four cards stating the
four possible cases: "has taken action A," "has not taken action A," "has
fulfilled precondition P," and "has not fulfilled precondition P."
The nonpragmatic-rule problem stated:
Below are four cards. Every card has a letter on one side and a number on
the other. Your task is to decide which of the cards you need to turn over in
order to find out whether or no a certain rule is being followed. The rule is:
"If a card has an A on one side, then it must have a 4 on the other side." Turn
over only those cards that you need to check to be sure." Drawings of four

cards followed, showing four possible cases: "A," "B (i.e., not A)," "4," and
"7 (i.e., not 4)."
As Jackson and Griggs (1990) noted, however, the two problems differ from one another
in several ways that have nothing to do with the presence vs. absence of a permission
rule. For example, the abstract permission-rule problem provided what Jackson and
Griggs referred to as a checking context, i.e., instructions to assume the role of an
authority checking for possible violators, whereas the nonpragmatic-rule problem
presented no such context. Further, the second and fourth cards in the permission-rule
problem (i.e., the not P and not Q cards) presented their negatives explicitly ("has not
taken Action A," and "has not fulfilled Precondition P"), whereas the corresponding cards
in the nonpragmatic-rule problem presented the negatives implicitly, but added a
parenthetical comment about their negative status,i.e., "B (i.e., not A)," and "7 (i.e., not
4)." (For a more detailed discussion of several additional differences between the two
problems, see Noveck & O'Brien, in press).
Jackson and Griggs also noted that although the original version of the selection task
required testing the truth or falsity of a hypothetical rule, the task versions with deontic
conditionals that subjects have solved have required instead identification of potential
rule violators. In other words, although the original task required identification of
potential falsifiers in reasoning about a conditional hypothesis, the deontic versions have
required identification of potential violators in reasoning from a conditional rule.
Jackson and Griggs reported that the permission rule problem was not solved when the
checking-content was removed, or when the explicit negatives were replaced with
implicit negatives, or when the task requires testing the truth of a rule rather than finding
violators of a rule, and they suggested that the apparent facilitation of P and not Q
responses by the abstract permission-rule problem was not the result of its permission
rule, but stemmed instead from the various other ways in which the two problems
differed. (2)
Several recent investigations (Girotto, Mazzocho, and Cherubini, 1992; Griggs and Cox,
1993; Kroger, Cheng, and Holyoak, 1993) have argued that Jackson and Griggs were
premature in dismissing the role of the permission rule, noting that Jackson and Griggs
failed to show that a problem without a pragmatic rule, but containing these various other
task features, led to task solution. These investigators have reported that solution seems
to require that the task contain several features. First, the task needs to have a deontic rule
rather than some otherwise arbitrary conditional; second, the task needs to present the
negatives in the cards explicitly rather than implicitly; third, the task needs to require
identification of potential violators of a rule rather than potential falsifiers of a
hypothesis. The absence of any of these features is sufficient to stop subjects from
solving the task. (3)
Collectively, Girotto et al., Kroger et al., and Griggs and Cox have argued for a deonticrelevance hypothesis. From this perspective, a problem with a permission rule can evoke
the permission schema with its four production rules, whereas a problem without such a

rule has no schema that it can engage. The presence of a checking context can aid in
evocation of the permission schema, although the schema might be engaged without such
a context. The use of instructions to seek potentially falsifying instances leads to a failure
to engage the permission schema, because the four production rules pertain only to the
discovery of potential violators and not to testing the rule. The explicit negatives are
required to help subjects to match the Not Q card onto Rule 4 of the permission schema.)
As further support for the deontic-relevance hypothesis Girotto et al. (1990), Griggs and
Cox, (1993), and Kroger et al. (1993) pointed out that the error patterns differed
significantly between non-permission-rule and permission-rule problems when implicit
negatives have been presented. Whereas the modal erroneous response pattern on the
arbitrary-rule problem has been to select the P and Q cards, it is the P-only selection that
has occurred most frequently on the permission-rule problem. These authors argued that
the P and Q response pattern occurred on the non-pragmatic problems because these
problems evoke no pragmatic schema and subjects therefore rely on a more primitive
matching strategy see Footnote 3). The pragmatic-rule problems, however, do evoke the
permission schema; with the implicit negatives, however, the not Q response is
suppressed because subjects fail to perceive its correspondence to Production Rule 4 of
the permission schema, where the information is stated explicitly (i.e., "If the
precondition is not satisfied...").
The PRS theorists have concluded that a problem will be solved when it includes the
following features: a pragmatic rule that allows a pragmatic schema to be evoked, explicit
negatives in the cards so that the information in the cards can be understood as
deontically relevant, and possibly a checking context (to aid in understanding that the
pragmatic schema should be evoked), and a search-for-violators form of the task (because
the pragmatic schemas pertain only to this sort of demand and are not pertinent to the
demands of tasks requiring falsification). In addition, Kroger et al. (1993, p. 633) stated
that "the favorable presentation factors will be useless for facilitating performance with
an arbitrary rule."
Recently, Noveck and O'Brien (in press) reported, however, that there are presentation
factors that facilitate P and not Q selections both with pragmatic rules and without them.
Their results were consistent with the predictions of the deontic-relevance hypothesis in
that neither use of explicit negatives nor of the violator instructions led to P and not Q
responses with non-pragmatic-rule problems, although these features were crucial to
solution of the pragmatic-rule problems. Noveck and O'Brien found, however, that there
are other task features that facilitate solution of permission-rule problems, and that these
features also lead to much higher rates of solution on the non-pragmatic-rule problems
when they are present. One feature concerns how the task instructions were given; for
example, presenting the violator instructions as "In order to check whether the regulation
has been violated, which of the cards would you turn over? Turn over those cards, and
only those cards, that you need to check to be sure" led to more solutions than did "Turn
over only those cards that you need in order to check that the rule is being followed."

Noveck and O'Brien found that the various task features that influence problem solution
interacted in a complex way. In particular, such features as the variation in wording of
instructions had an affect on the pragmatic-rule problems only when the problems were
presented with explicit negatives, whereas they affected the non-pragmatic-rule problems
whether the negatives were explicit or implicit. Noveck and O'Brien argued that this
indicates that the deontic and non-deontic rule problems were processed differently from
one another; whereas the deontic problems did not require specific instructions to search
for violators ("check whether the rule is being followed"), the non-deontic problems
required such specific instruction.
Noveck and O'Brien proposed that this difference reflects a difference between the two
sorts of conditionals in the ways that a counterexample is understood. As Manktelow and
Over (1991) noted, deontic conditionals involve roles that reflect people's intentions
about actions and contingencies. For example, consider the drinking-age problem with
the rule, "If a person drinks alcohol, then they must be at least 21 years of age." Finding a
16 year old drinking beer does not necessarily indicate that the drinking regulation is
false, yet it indicates that someone has violated or broken the drinking rule. Hence,
deontic conditionals can be violated, yet cannot be falsified. Consider, however, a
scientific hypothesis such as "If an object is dropped to the surface of Mars, it will fall at
a rate of 7 meters per second per second." In this case, observation of an object dropped
to the surface of Mars, but falling at different accelerating velocity, does not indicate that
the object is violating the proposition; rather, it would be more appropriate to say that the
proposition has been falsified. Consequently, although deontic regulations and indicative
natural laws both may be expressed in the form of conditionals, counterexamples to these
two sorts of conditionals have different implications.
Both the reasoning-from (i.e., violator) and reasoning-about (i.e., falsifier) versions of the
task require identification of potential counterexamples, i.e., of instances of P and not Q.
There is no reason, however, to expect that a subject required to falsify a deontic
conditional will find the request sensible, and thus may not think to find a potential
counterexample; similarly, a subject required to find potential violators of an indicative
conditional (such as a scientific hypothesis) may not find the request sensible, and thus
may not think to find a potential counterexample. Put simply, the present work is
motivated by the proposition that when the violator version of the task is presented with
an indicative conditional, or when the falsifier version is presented with a deontic
conditional, subjects are being required to make judgments that do not correspond to their
ordinary intuitions.
Experiment 1 addresses whether people typically share the intuition described in Noveck
and O'Brien that a counterexample to a deontic conditional violates that conditional and a
counterexample to an indicative conditional falsifies that conditional. In Experiment 2
several falsifier versions of the task with indicative conditionals are presented; each
problem makes clear that the subject is to seek information that could show the
conditional false. The work is exploratory, seeking to discover whether falsifier versions
of the selection task that present indicative conditionals can be constructed that subjects
will solve, i.e., that will lead to selection of the P and not Q situations. In Experiment 2

the problems are presented without the usual card format, instead listing four possible
situations corresponding to P, not P, Q, and not Q. This change was made so that any
possible problem difficulty associated with thinking about what is on alternative sides of
cards would be reduced. Experiment 3 investigates the possibility that presenting a
problem with a context that makes searching for a falsifying counterexample less obvious
will suppress P and not Q responses. Experiment 4 extends the sort of problems
presented in Experiment 2 by presenting the information is the usual card format.

Experiment 1
The goal of the problems presented here was to investigate the hypothesis that a
counterexample to a deontic conditional would be interpreted as violating that
conditional, whereas a counterexample to an indicative conditional would be interpreted
as falsifying that conditional. To that end, each problem presented a conditional (either
deontic or indicative) together with a counterexample, and presented two response
choices (one stating that the conditional had been violated, the other that the conditional
had be shown false).

Method
Subjects. Fifty-six undergraduate students participated to fulfill a requirement of the
introductory psychology course at Baruch College. Data for one additional participant are
not included because that participant failed to follow instructions.
Tasks and Procedure. Four problems were constructed, each presenting a conditional
together with its counterexample, and requiring participants to judge whether the
counterexample violates or falsifies the conditional. Each subject was presented all four
problems; the problems were on two pages, with one problem on each page containing a
deontic conditional and the other problem an indicative conditional. The four problems
were as follows. First, one of the indicative-conditional problems (The Ammonia
Problem) stated:
Some astronauts arrived on the Moon. The scientists told them that
according to the laws of Newtonian physics, liquid ammonia will follow this
rule:
If liquid ammonia is boiled on the surface of the Moon,
then its temperature will be above 180 degrees.
The astronauts boiled a beaker of ammonia, but its temperature was less than
180 degrees.
What do you think this means?

a) The beaker of ammonia was breaking the laws of Newtonian physics.
b) What the astronauts were told by the scientists about the rule was wrong.
Please choose the best answer and briefly explain why you chose that
answer.
The Ammonia Problem was presented on the same page as the following deonticconditional problem (the Grill Problem):
Some tour guides arrived at a restaurant in Gotham City. The Gotham City
health inspector told them that according to the public health laws, a
restaurant must follow this rule:
If a restaurant grills a hamburger,
then the temperature of the grill must be above 180 degrees.
The tour guides went into the restaurant kitchen, but found that the cook was
grilling a hamburger at a temperature far less than 180 degrees.
What do you think this means?
a) The restaurant was breaking the public health laws.
b) What the tour guides were told by the health inspector about the rule was
wrong.
Please choose the best answer and briefly explain why you chose that
answer.
The deontic-conditional problem on the second page (the Expressway Problem) was as
follows:
Some tourists arrived at the Gotham City Airport and rented a car. The car
rental agent told them that according to the highway safety laws a driver
must follow this rule:
If a car is driven on the Expressway,
then its speed must be kept below 65 miles per hour.
The tourists drove on the Expressway, and they kept their speed just below
65 miles per hour. They noticed that another car went past them at a much
higher speed.
What do you think this means?
a) The driver of the other car was breaking the highway safety laws.
b) What the tourists were told by the car rental agent about the rule was
wrong.

Please choose the best answer and briefly explain why you chose that
answer.
The Expressway Problem was presented on the same page as this indicative-conditional
problems (The Weight Problem):
Some astronauts arrived on the first landing on the planet Mars. The
scientists told them that according to the laws of Newtonian physics, a
weight will follow this rule:
If a weight is dropped to the surface of Mars,
it will fall at a rate of 9 meters per second per second.
The astronauts dropped a weight to the surface of Mars, but found that it fell
at a much higher speed.
What do you think this means?
a) What the astronauts were told by the scientists about the rule was wrong.
b) The weight was breaking the laws of Newtonian physics.
Please choose the best answer and briefly explain why you chose that
answer.
The task was administered individually. Subjects were informed that they were receiving
a logical reasoning task and that they should give their most considered answers; they
were asked to write a brief justification for each answer. The orders of the two problem
pages, of the problems on each page, and of the expected response choices were the
counterexamples (violating and falsifying interpretations) were counterbalanced.

Results and Discussion
Responses were scored by giving one point for each violator response, i.e., each
judgment that the conditional had been violated by the counterexample, and zero points
for each falsifier response. Thus, across the two problems of each type (deontic or
indicative), a score = 2.00 indicates two violator responses and a score = 0.00 indicates
two falsifier responses.
The mean for the deontic problems was 1.84 (i.e., 92% of responses to the deontic
problems were judgments that the conditional had been violated by the counterexample),
and the mean for the indicative problems was .54 (i.e., 73% of responses to the indicative
problems were judgments that the conditional was false given the counterexample). A
correlated t test revealed that the two means differed significantly, t (55) = 12.44, p <
.001, thus supporting the hypothesis. Two additional t tests were computed, one
comparing the observed mean for the deontic problems to what would be expected by
chance alone (chance = 1.00), yielding t (55) = 7.67, p < .001, the other comparing the
observed mean for the indicative problems to what would be expected by chance alone,

yielding t (55) = 4.24, p < .001. The results thus supported the expectation that a
counterexample to a deontic conditional would be interpreted as violating that
conditional, whereas a counterexample to an indicative conditional would be interpreted
as falsifying that conditional.

Experiment 2
Given the results of Experiment 1, the following expectations concerning construction of
versions of the selection task can be made: If one wants to construct a task with a deontic
conditional that corresponds to ordinary intuitions about the meaning of a
counterexample to a deontic conditional, the task should require identification of
potential violators of the conditional; if one wants to construct a task with an indicative
conditional that corresponds to ordinary intuitions about the meaning of a
counterexample to an indicative conditional, the task should require identification of
potential falsifying evidence for the conditional.
The goal of the present experiment was exploratory, seeking simply to construct
reasoning-from task versions with indicative conditionals that clearly require
identification of potentially falsifying information. The problems differ from the usual
task version in that they did not show pictures of four cards; rather, they listed four
situations. This change was made so that any possible difficulty stemming from requiring
thinking about cards and their sides would be eliminated.
All of the problems presented indicative conditionals that were locative, that is, they had
antecedents that provided conditional directions concerning someone going to some
location and consequents that follow from going to that location. This locative sort of
conditional was presented because locatives are among the earliest sorts of semantic
categories available in language acquisition (e.g., Braine, 1976), and thus it was expected
that locatives would be readily understood by adult subjects.

Method
Subjects. One-hundred-sixty-eight undergraduates participated to fulfill a requirement of
the introductory psychology course at Baruch College.
Tasks and Procedure. Six reasoning-from selection-task problems were constructed, each
with an indicative conditional, and each clearly requiring selection of the potentially
falsifying instances. Each problem first presented a narrative providing a context for the
conditional, followed by an indicative conditional, and then by the task instructions and
finally a list of four possible situations, corresponding to P, not-P, Q, and not-Q.
Each subject was assigned randomly to one of the six problems, and the task was
administered in small groups (between 5 and 20 participants per group). Each subject was
asked to write a brief justification for their selections.

One problem, referred to as the If-Third-then-Corner-of-Main Problem, was as follows:
Robert lives in Gotham City. He is not a very nice person. He likes to make
up things that are not true, and he thinks it's funny when he tricks people.
Yesterday, some tourists to Gotham City asked Robert about how to get to
Gideon's Department Store. Robert told them:
If you take a left at Third Avenue, you will find
Gideon's Department Store on the corner of Main Street.
These tourists became very upset when they found out that Robert had lied
to them. Now consider the following list of four possible situations that
might have happened. Put a check mark next to each situation that would
have led these tourists to discovering that Robert had lied to them.
1) The tourists took a left at Third Avenue.
2) The tourists did not take a left at Third Avenue.
3) The tourists found Gideon's Department Store on the comer of Main
Street.
4) The tourists did not find Gideon's Department Store on the comer of Main
Street.
A second problem, referred to as the If-Third-and-Main-then-Gas-Station Problem, was
identical to the first problem, except (a) the tourists asked for directions to a gas station
rather than to Gideon's Department Store, (b) the conditional was changed to "If you go
to the comer of Third Avenue and Main Street, you'll find a gas station there," (c)
references to lying in the first problem were changed to references about "Robert had not
told them the truth" and "what Robert told them was not true."
A third problem, referred to as the If-Siam-then-McDonalds Problem was as follows:
Some American tourists in Bangkok, Thailand, had become tired of eating
nothing but Thai food, and decided they would like to find a McDonalds.
The manager of their hotel told them:
If you go to the Siam Square Mall,
there is a McDonalds in the food court.
The tourists became upset when they concluded that what the manager said
was wrong. Please indicate each situation below that would have led the
tourists to become upset.
a) The tourists went to the Siam Square Mall
b) The tourists did not go to the Siam Square Mall
c) The tourists found a McDonalds in the food court
d) The tourists did not find a McDonalds in the food court

The fourth problem, referred to as the If-Siam-then-Find-McDonalds Problem, was
identical to the If-Siam-then-McDonalds Problem, except that the conditional was
presented as "If you go to the Siam Square Mall, you will find a McDonalds in the food
court." This change was motivated to investigate a possible difference between two sorts
of conditionals: One in which the consequent relies on its antecedent and one in which
the consequent could be true whether or not its antecedent was true.
A fifth problem, referred to as the If-Hilton-then-Game Problem, was as follows:
Tom had to go on a business trip to Montana and would be gone until
Friday. He was disappointed because he wanted to watch the New York
Knicks basketball game on television Thursday night. His boss told him not
to worry because
If you stay in the Hilton Hotel, the game will be available on satellite television.
Tom was disappointed when he discovered that what his boss told him was
not true.
Please put a check mark next to each situation below that would have led
Tom to discovering that what his boss told him was not true.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Tom stayed in the Hilton Hotel.
Tom did not stay in the Hilton Hotel.
The game was available on satellite television.
The game was not available on satellite television.

This problem was included because, although it had a locative antecedent, its consequent
referred to an event that could occur at that location rather than simply to something that
could be found at that location, thus providing additional variety among the problems.
A sixth problem, referred to as the If-Route-R-then-Location-L Problem, was as follows:
Peter lives in Gotham City: He is not a very nice person. He likes to make up things that
are not true, and he thinks it's funny when he tricks people. Yesterday, some tourists
became very upset when they found out that Peter had not told them the truth.
Now consider the following list of four possible situations that might have happened. Put
a check mark next to each situation that could have led these tourists to discovering that
what Peter told them was not true.
1) The tourists took Route R.
2) The tourists did not take Route R.
3) The tourists got to Location L.
4) The tourists did not get to Location L.

This problem was provided in order to present an abstract-content version of a locativetype problem.

Results and Discussion
Only two response patterns (the logically appropriate P and not Q pattern and the not Q
only patterns) occurred on any problem with greater frequency than would be expected
by chance. (Chance = .0625 because each of the four situations has a .50 probability of
being selected, and .504 = .0625.) The proportions with which each of these two response
patterns occurred are shown in Table 1. (4) Inspection of Table 1 reveals that the
logically appropriate response pattern (i.e., selection of the P and not Q situations that
could lead to a counterexample) was made more often than would be expected by chance
on all six problems, although not equally across all problems. Tests for the significance of
a difference between two independent proportions were computed, revealing that the IfThird-and-Main-then-Gas-Station problem was more likely than any other problem to
elicit the P and not Qresponse pattern (z = 2.53, p < .025 when compared to the If-Route
R-then-Location-L problem, which was the problem with the least amount of difference.)
The If-Siam-then-McDonalds problem was less likely to elicit the P and not Q pattern
than any other problem, except the If-Siam-then-Find McDonalds, and this latter problem
was less likely to elicit the P and not Q pattern than all of the other problems except the
If-Third-then-Comer-of-Main problem (z = 2.96, p < .005, when compared to the IfThird-then-Comer-of-Main problem, which was the problem with the least amount of
difference that achieved statistical significance).
The only other response pattern that occurred more often than would be expected by
chance alone was the selection of only the not Q situation, and on these problems the
differences among problems were the mirror image of those for the P and not Q pattern,
occurring more often on the two If-Siam problems, and least often on the If-Third-andMain-then-Gas-Station problem and the If-Route-R-then-Location-L problem. Taken
together, these two response patterns accounted for the overwhelming majority of
responses, and hardly any responses of the sort found typically on the traditional selection
task with an indicative conditional were made, i.e., the P and Q pattern and the P only
pattern.
Table 2 shows the proportions with which each of the four situations were selected on the
six problems, summed across all response patterns. Inspection of Table 2 reveals that
subjects almost always understood that assessing the situation in which the consequent is
false is required to test the possible falsity of an indicative conditional, something the
previous literature has not reported.
Not all of the problems, however, led subjects to selection of the P situation. Inspection
of their written justifications provides some insight into why some problems discouraged
selection of the P situation. Consider first the difference between the If-Third-thenComer-of-Main problem (on which selection of P was far from universal) and the IfThird-and-Main-then-Gas-Station problem (on which selection of P almost always
occurred). Written justifications on the Comer-of-Main problem indicated that many

subjects thought that the tourists might get to the comer of Third and Main by an
alternative route, and this would be sufficient to establish that the conditional is false
upon the discovery that its consequent is false, and would still be false if the tourists took
the route (via Third Avenue) recommended. Similarly, the two Siam-and-McDonalds
problems apparently discouraged selection of the P situation for the same sort of reason:
The tourists could discover that there is no MacDonalds at the food court without actually
going to Siam Square, and this falsity of the consequent would hold if they had followed
the manager's advice.
Tables 1 and 2
In summary, the vast majority of subjects ignored the not P and the Q situations and
selected from the P and not Q situations. These findings reveal a far greater appreciation
of what falsifies a conditional than previous investigations have suggested.

Experiment 3
The problems presented here had two goals. One was to present an indicative conditional
that went beyond the sorts of locative directions presented in the problems presented in
Experiment 1. This was accomplished by constructing a problem in which the conditional
refers to an event and a financial outcome. The second goal was to provide a problem in
which the context of the falsity judgment might possibly lead subjects away from a
strictly logical search for a counterexample, and towards a strategy that would seek an
explanation for the context.

Method
Subjects. Sixty-two undergraduate participated to fulfill a requirement of the introductory
psychology course at Baruch College.
Tasks and Procedure. The procedures were identical to those of Experiment 2. Three
newly constructed problems were presented. One problem, If-Taxi-then-More-Than-$20
Problem
Robert lives in Gotham City. He is not a very nice person. He likes to make
up things that are not true, and he thinks it's funny when he tricks people.
Yesterday, some tourists to Gotham City asked Robert about how to get to
the airport. Robert told them:
If you take a taxicab to the airport, it will cost more than $20.
These tourists became very upset when they found out that Robert had lied
to them. Now consider the following list of four possible situations that

might have happened. Put a check mark next to each situation that would
have led these tourists to discovering that Robert had lied to them.
1) The tourists took a taxicab to the airport.
2) The tourists did not take a taxicab to the airport.
3) The cost was less than $20.
4) The cost was more than $ 20.
If-Taxi-then-Less-Than-$20 Problem
This problem is same as the If-Taxi- then-More-Than-S20 Problem, except that i.e., the
conditional "If you take a taxicab to the airport, it will cost more than $20" is modified to
"If you take a taxicab to the airport, it will cost less than $20." This modification was
made to investigate the possibility that searching for a counterexample could be
suppressed by a context that makes such a search inappropriate.

Results and Discussion
The proportions with which those response patterns made more often than would be
expected by chance alone are shown in Table 3. Inspection of Table 3 reveals that
responses to the If-Taxi-then-Less -Than-$20 problem were quite similar to the problems
in Experiment 2 in that only the P and not Q and the not Q response patterns occurred
more often than would be expected by chance alone. Neither of these two response
patterns occurred more than rarely on the If-Taxi-then-More-Than-S20 problem, which
led instead to three different response patterns: P only, not P only, and not P and not Q;
none of these patterns were typical on any of the other problems in Experiments 2 and 3.
The If-Taxi-then-Less-Than-$20 was significantly more likely to elicit the P and not Q
response pattern than was the If-Taxi-then-More-Than-$20, z = 4.70, p < .00 I, and more
likely to elicit the not Q only pattern, z = 3.69, p < .001. Differences between the two
problems for the P only, and the not P and not Q patterns failed to achieve statistical
significance, but they did differ significantly on the not P only pattern, z = 3.03, p < .005.
The proportions with which each of the four situations were selected on the two
problems, summed across all response patterns are shown in Table 4. Although almost all
selections on the If-Taxi-then-Less-Than-$20 problems were of the P and not Q
situations, revealing an appreciation of the need to find a counterexample, the modal
response to the If-Taxi-then-More-Than-$20 problem was selection of the not P situation.
Inspection of written justifications indicates that this selection was made from
consideration of what might have upset the tourists, and most subjects assumed that they
became upset because they did not follow the advice, believing that to do so would be too
expensive, only to discover that they should have taken a taxi. This indicates that subjects
did not understand their task as being a search for potentially falsifying information, but
rather to find what would have upset the tourists. Clearly, if subjects are to make the
logically appropriate responses, they must understand clearly that this is what they are
expected to do.

Tables 3 and 4

Experiment 4
The problems here investigate any possible effects of presenting cards in the traditional
style with four cards, rather than presenting a list of situations as was done in
Experiments 2 and 3.

Method
Subjects. One-hundred-fifty-three undergraduate students participated to fulfill a
requirement of the introductory psychology course at Baruch College.
Tasks and Procedure. Six problems were constructed. One problem was identical to the
If-Third-and-Main-then-Gas-Station Problem of Experiment 2 except that the list of four
situations was replaced by four cards, and subjects were instructed to "circle each card
that might reveal that what Peter told them was not true." The four cards showed "The
tourists went to the comer of Third Avenue and Main Street," "The tourists did not go to
the comer of Third Avenue and Main Street," "The tourists found a gas station there,"
"The tourists did not find a gas station there." The other five problems are shown in Table
5. The procedures were the same as in Experiments 2 and 3.
Table 5

Results and Discussion
The proportions with which those response patterns that were made more often than
would be expected by chance alone are shown in Table 6. Inspection of Table 6 reveals
that on all six problems the P and not Q response pattern occurred more often than would
be expected by chance alone. Tests for the significance of a difference between two
independent proportions revealed no differences among the problems for this pattern. The
presentation of the situations as information written on the sides of cards thus did not
appreciably influence performance in relation to the lists of situations presented in
Experiments 2 and 3.
Only three other response patterns occurred more often than would be expected by
chance alone: the not Q only pattern on the If-Million-Dollars-then-Sell problem, the P
only pattern on the If-One-ounce-then-Six-Months problem and the not P and not Q
pattern on the If-Right-then-Deep problem. None of these response patterns occurred as
often as the P and not Q pattern.
Tables 6 and 7

Table 7 shows the proportion with which each situation was selected on each of the six
problems, summed across response patterns. Inspection of Table 7 shows that both the P
and the not Q selections were made much more often than the not P and the Q selections.
Taken together, the results shown in Tables 6 and 7 show that across all six problems
subjects understood that seeking a counterexample is the appropriate way to falsify the
indicative conditional.

General Discussion
Until now no falsifier version of the selection task had been reported on which subjects
make the logically appropriate selections of P and not Q, although many violator versions
with deontic conditionals have elicited such responses. This had led many theorists to
claim that people have some special mental processes for reasoning about deontic
regulations. The present results clearly show that construction of a falsifier version of the
task with an indicative conditional that subjects are able to solve is possible. The claims
of earlier researchers that people have a special sensitivity to deontic regulations is thus
brought into serious doubt. The present results indicate that earlier findings must have
relied on some specific task features that had discouraged the logically appropriate
responses and that college undergraduates are able to seek falsifying evidence when the
need for such is made clear to them.
Because deontic conditionals per se do not take truth assignments, they are outside the
scope of propositional reasoning (given that propositions by definition take on truth
values), and requiring falsification of a deontic conditional does not correspond to
ordinary psychological intuitions about such regulations. Indicative claims, however, are
within the scope of propositional reasoning, and requiring falsification of an indicative
conditional does correspond to ordinary psychological intuitions about conditional
propositions. In brief, it takes a regulation to be violated and it takes a proposition to be
falsified. When psychological researchers conflate the demands of these two sorts of
conditionals, subjects will not demonstrate their awareness of what constitutes a
counterexample. Such mismatches between task demands and types of conditionals have
led an entire area of cognitive research to come to an erroneous conclusion about a
central feature of human deductive reasoning.
Why have previous researchers failed to find subjects making P and not Q responses on
indicative-conditional falsifier versions of the task, as was found in the Experiments
reported here? The present research does not provide a definitive explanation, and further
research is required to answer this question. However, a reasonable supposition is that
unlike the problems presented here, previously reported problems have not been clear in
their instructions to subjects about what they were being required to do, i.e., to search for
potentially falsifying evidence. Typically, subjects are asked merely to turn over those
cards that could test whether or not a rule is true. This sort of instruction can discourage
the logically appropriate responses for two reasons: First, the problems present an
indicative conditional as though it were a rule, and it cannot reasonably be considered a

rule, but is rather an indicative description. Second, the wording ("whether or not the rule
is true") fails to signal that the task actually requires finding whether the conditional is
false. It may well be the case that when presented with a deontic regulation and the
instruction to discover whether the rule is being obeyed that subjects understand that they
are looking for potential violators. Such an interpretation of the task probably is
encouraged by presentation of a checking context (e.g., "Assume that you are a
policeman..."), for it is not the usual role of an authority checking for compliance to a
rule to find those individuals who are not violating the rule. (Policemen issue tickets to
rule violators, but do not issue credits to rule followers.) It may not similarly be the case
that someone seeking to find out whether an indicative claim is true will proceed from the
assumption that discovering falsity is the goal.
Deontic and indicative conditionals of the sort discussed here are not the only sorts of
conditionals that might require special consideration concerning how a counterexample is
interpreted, i.e., whether the counterexample is taken as falsifying or as violating its
conditional. Consider the class of conditional promises, for example, "If you loan me
$200, I'll pay you back next Tuesday." This conditional is not deontic, in the sense of a
regulation described earlier; there is no modal ("must") as in a deontic regulation: such a
promise is intentional, but not deontic. Given that it is intentional, however, it is not
purely indicative either. In such a case, is the counterexample falsifying or violating?
Suppose the counterexample occurs, and you loan me $200 but I fail to pay you back on
Tuesday. Clearly I have broken my promise, that is, I have violated the conditional
promise. Note however, that this violation shows that my initial promise was a lie. Future
research may well find that there are classes of conditionals for which falsification
instructions and violation instructions are equally appropriate. On the sorts of tasks that
one finds in the literature to date, however, confusing falsifier and violator versions of the
task can only lead to false assessments of some basic human deductive processes.
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Footnotes
1. "Deontic" refers to statements concerning regulations (either judicial or moral)
delineating obligations or permissions; "indiCative" refers to statements concerning
matters of fact.

2. Jackson and Griggs (1990) accounted for their results in terms of Evans's two stage
theory (Evans, 1984). According to Jackson and Griggs, the presence of explicit
negatives, (e.g., "has not taken action A" and "has not fulfilled precondition P," in the
permission rule problem is important during a heuristic stage where they would focus
attention so that subjects would find all four cads relevant to the rule; the implicit
negatives would cause subjects to disregard the Not P and Not Q cards because they are
not named in the rule. Then, during an analytic processing stage, the presence of a
checking-context would trigger subjects to look for violators of the rule, whereas the
absence of the checking-context would not alert the subjects to look for violators, because
they would not be sure what the rule is asking them to do. Moreover, they claimed that
when the checking-context and the explicit negatives are removed from the abstract
permission rule problem, subjects become prey to matching bias. Matching bias initially
was proposed by Evans and Lynch (1973). According to this, when subjects are presented
with abstract problems, they become thoroughly confused and tend to choose the values
that are named in the rule, (e.g., P and Q cards). Jackson and Griggs thus concluded that
evoking the permission schema is not the real reason for the facilitation on the permission
rule problem; rather, extraneous task features such as the checking-context and the
explicit negatives are responsible for the facilitation.
3. Griggs (1989) reported a non-pragmatic-rule violator problem that often leads to the P
and not Q response pattern. For some reason this problem is rarely acknowledged in
discussion by PRS theory advocates.
4. Table 1 indicates which response patterns occurred more often than would be expected
by chance alone.

Table 1
Proportions of the commonly occurring response pattern for the problems of Experiment
2
Response Patterns
Problems

P, ~Q

~Q

Other

If-Third-then-Comer-of-Main (n = 39)

.41*** .33*** .26

If-Third-and-Main-then-Gas-Station (n = 25)

.80*** .08

If-Siam-then-McDonalds (n = 24)

.17*

.58*** .25

If-Siam-then-Find-McDonalds (n = 22)

.23**

.73*** .05

If-Hilton-then-Game (n = 29)

.45*** .24*** .31

If-Route-R-then-Location-L (n = 29)

.59*** .07

.12

.34

Note: P, Not Q indicates selection of the P and the not-Q situations; Not-Q indicates
selection of the Not-Q situation; * indicates a response pattern that occurred more often
than would be expected by chance, p < .05; ** indicates a response pattern that occurred
more often than would be expected by chance, p < .01; *** indicates a response pattern
that occurred more often than would be expected by chance, p < .001.

Table 2
Proportions with which the P, not-P, Q and not-Q situations were selected in Experiment
2
Situations Selected
Problems

P

~P

Q

~Q

If-Third-then-Comer-of-Main (n = 39)

.59 .08 .15 .90

If-Third-and-Main-then-Gas-Station (n = 25)

.92 .04 .04 .92

If-Siam-then-McDonalds (n = 24)

.25 .13 .13 .79

If-Siam-then-Find-McDonalds (n = 22)

.27 .00 .00 .95

If-Hilton-then-Game (n = 29)

.55 .21 .07 .83

If-Route-R-then-Location-L (n = 29)

.83 .10 .17 .69

Note: The notation is the same as in Table 1.

Table 3
Proportions of commonly occurring response patterns for the problems of Experiment 3
Response Patterns
Problems

P, ~Q

~Q

If-Taxi-then-LessThan-$20 (n = 27)

.56*** .33*** .04

If-Taxi-then-MoreThan-$20 (n = 35)

.04

.00

Note: The notation is the same as in Table 1.

P

~P

~P,~Q Other

.00

.00

.21** .29*** .17*

.07
.29

Table 4
Proportions with which the P, not-P, Q and not-Q situations were selected in Experiment
3
Situations Selected
Problems

P

~P

Q

~Q

If-Taxi-then-Less-Than $20 (n = 27)

.67

.00

.07

.89

If-Taxi-then-More-Than-$20 (n = 35)

.54

.67

.25

.38

Note: The notation is the same as in Table 1.

Table 5
Problems presented in Experiment 4.
If-Gideons-then-Free
Bob and Carol wanted to buy a new sofa, and had just enough money to buy
one they saw advertised at Gideon's Department Store. They were worried
that they did not have enough money to pay the delivery charge. Carol's
sister, Anne, told them not to worry because

If you buy a sofa at Gideon's
Department Store, they will deliver it for free.
Bob and carol were disappointed when they discovered that what Anne told
them was wrong.
Below are pictures of four cards. One side of each card shows the name of a
store, and the other side shows that store's policy for furniture delivery.
Please circle the card or cards that could show that what Anne said is
wrong. (The four cards show "Gideon's Department Store," "Wellstone's
Department Store," "Furniture deliveries are free," "furniture deliveries are
not free. There is a $25 charge.")

If-One-Ounce-then-Six-Months.
Al Mulligan was elected governor of Gotham State after promising to get
tough against drug users. He promised that after he became governor:
Anyone found in possession of more than one ounce of marijuana
will spend at least 6 months in jail.
His promise was a lie.
Below are pictures of four cards, each containing information about a person
while Mulligan was governor. One side of each card shows whether or not a
person was found in possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. The
other side shows whether or not that same person spent at least 6 months in
jail.
Circle each card that could show that Governor Mulligan's promise was a
lie.
( The four cards show "This person was found in possession of more than
one ounce of marijuana," "This person was not found in possession of
marijuana," "This person spent at least 6 months in jail," "This person did
not spend any time in jail.")
If-Right-then-Deep
Captain Hazleton was bringing a large oil tanker into the harbor at a new oil shipment
center. He wanted to be particularly careful because this was his first trip into this harbor.
After reading the navigational charts he decided:
If we stay to the right of the red marker, the water will be deep enough.
It turned out that he was wrong about this.
Below are pictures of four cards. One side of each card shows whether or not Captain
Hazelton's oil tanker stayed to the right of the red marker, and the other side shows
whether the water was deep enough.
Please circle each card that could show that what Captain Hazleton said was wrong. ( The
four cards show "The oil tanker stayed to the right of the red marker," "The oil tanker did
not stay to the right of the red marker," "The water was deep enough," "The water was
not deep enough.")
If-Rolf-then-Beat-Eric

Dagvar was the chief of Danish tribe in the 12th century. He was very ambitious and
wanted to challenge an even more powerful chief, Eric Thorkold. Dagvar told his
warriors that although we might not be able to beat Eric Thorkold by ourselves:
If we join forces with my cousin, Roll, we can beat Eric Thorkold.
Unfortunately for Dagvar, he was wrong.
Below are pictures of four cards. One side of each card shows whether or not Dagvar and
Roif joined their forces, and the other side shows whether or not they beat Eric Thorkold.
Please circle each card that could show that what Dagvar said was wrong.
(The four cards show "Dagvar and Roif joined forces," "Dagvar and Rolf did not join
forces," "They beat Eric Thorkold," "They did not beat Eric Thorkold.")
If-Million-Dollars-then-Sell
Donald Tramp was an important land developer who wanted to build a new casino.
Before he could build the casino he wanted, however, he needed to buy a small plot of
land owned by Mrs. Bortofski. Donald Tramp told his business partners not to worry
because
If I offer Mrs. Bortofski a million dollars,
then she will sell the land.
Donald Tramp was wrong about this.
Below are pictures of four cards. One side of each card shows whether or not Mrs.
Bortofski was offered a million dollars, and the other side shows whether or not she sold
the land.
Circle each card that could show that what Donald Tramp said was wrong.
(The four cards show "Donald Tramp offered Mrs. Bortofski a million dollars," "Donald
Tramp did not offer Mrs. Bortofski a million dollars," "Mrs. Bortofski sold the land,"
"Mrs. Bortofski did not sell the land.")

Table 6
Proportions of the response patterns for the problem in Experiment 4
Response Patterns

Problems

P, ~Q

If-Third-and-Main-then-GasStation (n = 28)
If-Gideon's-then-Free (n = 21 )

~Q

P

~P,~Q Other

.68*** .14

.07

.00

.11

.52*** .14

.05

.10

.19

.19** .04

.15

If-One-Ounce-then-Six-Months
.46*** .15
(n = 26)
If-Right-then-Deep (n = 23)

.48*** .13

.04

.17*

.17

If-Rolf-then-Beat-Eric (n = 34)

.47*** .09

.03

.12

.29

If-Million-Dollars-then-Sell (n
= 21)

.52*** .24*** .10

.00

.14

Note: The notation is the same as in Table 1.

Table 7
Proportions with which the P, not-P, Q and not-Q situations were selected in Experiment
4
Situations Selected
Problems

P

~P

Q

~Q

If-Third-and-Main-then-Gas-Station (n = 28)

.82 .04 .11 .86

If-Gideon' s-then-Free (n = 21 )

.67 .19 .14 .81

If-One-Ounce-then-Six-Months (n = 26)

.73 .12 .15 .65

If-Right-then-Deep (n = 23)

.61 .26 .09 .78

If-Roll-then-Beat-Eric (n = 34)

.62 .24 .26 .68

If-Million-Dollars-then-Sell (n = 21)

.71 .05 .10 .76

Note: The notation is the same as in Table 1.
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